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Abstract. In practical applications, the owner of an RFID-tagged item can change.
In this paper, we propose a new RFID ownership transfer protocol using ellipticcurve cryptography. The paper first considers security and privacy requirements
in the ownership transfer process. Then the paper provides a detailed description
of our ownership transfer scheme outlining various protocol phases. Key features
of the proposed scheme are that it allows controlled delegation and authorisation
recovery, and the ownership transfer is achieved without a trusted third party. We
describe a security analysis of the proposed scheme and demonstrate that it meets
the desired security and privacy requirements. We also illustrate the performance
results and show that our scheme is feasible for lightweight RFID tags.
Keywords. RFID, Ownership Transfer, Security, Privacy, Controlled Delegation

1. Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been long considered as a substitute for barcodes and offers several highly attractive features. RFID technology is widely used in
many applications in our daily life, such as supply chain, access control, automatic payment, animal tracking and electronic passports [6]. RFID tags usually have limited memories and weak computational capabilities due to inexpensive cost and easy deployment.
Therefore, RFID systems are vulnerable to various critical security threats. Over the
recent years, several security and privacy concerns have been raised in many research
works [6].
Communications between RFID tags and readers are vulnerable to various attacks.
A tag could be eavesdropped and manipulated illegally since the communication between reader and tag are often via insecure wireless channel. In addition, each RFID tag
contains a unique piece of information which can be used to identify itself. An adver-

sary can trace or distinguish a tag from other tags if the unique information is captured
during communication between the tag and the reader. On the other hand, passive tags
usually have limited memory and low processing capacity, and hence strong security approaches are infeasible in practice. Therefore, they are not usually tamper-resistant and
are vulnerable to compromise.
Ownership means that only the owner has access to the tag and is able to interact with
it in the secure manner; hence the owner and the tag should be able to authenticate each
other. However, in many applications, during the lifetime of a tagged item, the owner of
the item may change several times. When the ownership transfers, the previous owner
needs to pass the secure information to the new owner. As a result, both the previous and
the new owner are able to authenticate and identify the tag, and moreover, communicate
with it. This may cause a problem since the privacy of either the tag or the owners can
be easily infringed. A number of papers have been published to provide proper solutions
for tag ownership transfer [12,16,14,11,4,17,8,2,3,7,13]. Most of the schemes are based
on symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms such as hash functions and pseudo-random
number generators because of the simplicity compared to asymmetric-key cryptography.
However, it has been shown that such schemes often result in scalability as well as security and/or privacy problems. Recent works show that it is feasible to employ elliptic
curve cryptography on lightweight RFID tags [1,5,10]. In such schemes, it is assumed
that the RFID tags are able to process modular additions, modular multiplications and
elliptic curve scalar multiplications. We will be using this assumption and proposing a
public key absed RFID ownership transfer scheme.
1.1. Contribution and Paper Organisation
In this paper, we propose a RFID ownership transfer scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first elliptic-curve based ownership transfer protocol. We show that the
proposed scheme is secure and private. Furthermore, it is able to achieve the features like
controlled delegation and authorisation recovery. The rest of this paper is organised as
follows. The ownership transfer protocols are reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, we give
the description of the preliminaries for our scheme and outline the security and privacy
requirements. Our elliptic-curve based RFID ownership transfer protocol is proposed in
Section 4. In Section 5, we provide the security analysis of our scheme. In Section 6, we
show the performance results of our scheme. Section 7 concludes this paper.

2. Related Work
Molnar, Soppera and Wagner [12] introduced the concept of ownership transfer in 2005.
They proposed an RFID pseudonym protocol based on pseudo-random function and
shared secrets. Their scheme employed a trusted centre in a tree structure to manage the
shared secret with the tag. All the readers need the assistance from the trusted centre to
authenticate the tag because only the trusted centre is able to identify the tag. The trusted
centre controls the access privilege according to the ownership policy of the tag. After
the ownership is transferred, the previous owner is not allowed to access the tag. Since
the tag uses a unique pseudonym to each query, it is impossible for the previous owner to
identify the tag without the help of the trusted centre. The trusted centre can also delegate

a reader limited access to the tag by giving it a derived key. For each query made by the
readers, the tag generates a pseudonym using pseudo-random function and the derived
key to protect its real ID. The tag also maintains a counter to determine the number of
queries. After the counter reaches the maximum value designated by the trusted centre,
the delegation automatically expires. There are several similar schemes [16,14,4,8] that
also employ a trusted third party to control the ownership transfer. However, all of them
are based on symmetric cryptographic primitives. The shared secret between the tag and
the reader will be revealed to the adversary if the tag is compromised. Moreover, the
privacy of the tag and the owner cannot be guaranteed.
Besides the protocols based on trusted third party, there also exist several ownership
tranfer schemes involing only tags and owners. Saito, Imamoto and Sakurai [16] presented an ownership transfer scheme without the trusted third party. Upon receiving the
ownership from the previous owner, the new owner updates the secret shared with the
tag. However, their scheme is built under a fairly strong assumption that it is difficult for
the adversary to exploit the communication channel from the tag to the reader because
the range of the channel is short. Song [17] proposed an ownership transfer protocol as
well as a security property called authorisation recovery. The previous owner is able to
recover the ownership and temporarily interact with the tag. This property is quite useful
considering in an after-sales scenario, the seller may need to verify the product before
providing a repair service. However, the protocol does not provide information and location privacy and an adversary can perform a denial-of-service attack by simply blocking
and forging the second message in the protocol flow [15]. Also, [13] argued that Song’s
protocol changes the share secret to previous owner’s key for authorisation recovery,
which actually means sharing ownership causing the ownership of the tag to become
unclear. In RFIDSec’11, Fernández-Mir, Trujillo-Rasua, Castellá-Roca and DomingoFerrer [3] introduced a novel ownership transfer protocol that provides controlled delegation without the need of a stored counter in the tag. The server maintains a table storing the hash chain of MAX size to identify a tag. However, this protocol is vulnerable
to denial-of-service attack because an adversary can always block the update message
MAX + 1 times. The time consumption and storage cost could become huge even though
the system may set the value MAX to a relatively high value to prevent the attack.

3. Preliminaries
In this section, first we outline the system model and assumptions, and then describe the
security and privacy requirements for our scheme.
3.1. System Model and Assumptions
Each owner has his/her own personal reader, which is securely connected to his/her own
database. Therefore, we consider the reader and the database as an entity and refer it
as the reader. This model removes the need for a trusted centre that is required in a
centralised model to maintain the current and/or previous ownership of each tag.
As there can be different settings in the same system model, we make the following
assumptions for our model.

• The manufacturer is trusted. The manufacturer creates items and attaches a tag to
every single item. It also writes the initial state in every tag.
• A tag has a rewritable memory, and is able to perform lightweight cryptographic
operations.
• A tag is vulnerable to compromise attacks. That is to say, an adversary can obtain
the internal secrets of a tag.
• An owner is an entity who engages in the ownership transfer. Each owner has a
reader to communicate with the target tag.
• An owner communicates with the target tag via insecure radio-frequency interface.
However, the communication between two owners is assumed to be secure.
• The current owner has the full control over its tag.
3.2. Security and Privacy Requirements
We now define our RFID security model. Firstly, the adversary is assumed to have complete control over the communication channel between tag and reader. Namely, it can
observe, modify and block all exchanged messages, and generate new messages. The
potential threats against the RFID system are listed as follows.
• Replay Attack: An adversary maliciously repeats previous communications between a reader and a tag to perform a successful authentication.
• Man-in-the-Middle Attack: An adversary inserts, modifies or deletes messages
sent between a reader and a tag without being detected.
• Denial-of-Service Attack (De-Synchronization Attack): An adversary blocks or
tampers with messages passed on between a reader and a tag, which causes the
reader and the tag to lose synchronisation so that they cannot authenticate each
other in future communications.
• Backward Traceability: An active adversary is able to identify a target tag from
the past interactions between the tag and a reader, using the knowledge of the tag’s
present internal state by corrupting the tag.
• Forward Traceability: An active adversary is unable to identify a target tag from
the future interactions between the tag and a reader, using the knowledge of the
tag’s present internal state by corrupting the tag.
In addition to the potential threats against general RFID systems, we also identify
the security requirements from the previous ownership transfer schemes.
• Previous Owner Privacy: When the ownership transfer protocol is completed, the
new owner cannot trace past communications between the previous owner and the
tag.
• New Owner Privacy: When the ownership transfer protocol is completed, the old
owner cannot trace future communications between the new owner and the tag.
• Controlled Delegation: The present owner of the tag temporarily delegates the
access right of the tag to another entity without giving out the ownership. The
owner is able to cancel the delegation at anytime. Moreover, the delegation will
automatically expires at some time.
• Authorisation Recovery: The previous owner is able to access the tag with permission granted by the current owner. The current owner can cancel the temporary

authorisation at anytime. This security property can be considered as a special
case of controlled delegation.
The scheme that we are proposing in the paper aims to address the above security
and privacy requirements.

4. Our Ownership Transfer Scheme
4.1. Setup
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field Z∗p , where p is an k-bit prime number.
Assume the point P is a generator of G, which is the group of points on the elliptic
cure E. Let (SKoi , PKoi ) = (yoi , yoi P) be the public-private key pair of the ith Owner.
Note that these key pair are used in tag-owner communications. The manufacturer is the
special owner o0 . The manufacturer randomly chooses a public-private key pair SKt = x,
PKt = xP for the target tag when creating the product that the tag is attached to, and sets
the internal state of the tag (SKt , PKo0 ).
4.2. Protocol Phases
In this section we describe different phases of our scheme. Our scheme is composed of
key change protocol, transfer protocol, key update protocol and controlled delegation
protocol. The notations used in our scheme is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. Notations of the proposed scheme
Notation

Interpretation

SKt
PKt
PKo
SKi
PKi

the private key of the tag
the public key of the tag, also used as the tag’s identity IDt
the public key of the current owner stored in the tag
the private key of the ith owner
the public key of the ith owner

PKb
c
cm
Auth(PKo )

the backup public key stored in the tag
the counter stored in the tag
the maximun value of the counter for delegation
the tag authenticates the reader using the owner’s public key

Key Change Protocol. In this protocol, the current owner (denoted by Owneri ) updates
its public key stored in the tag (denoted by Tag) with a temporary one so that the new
owner (denoted by Owneri+1 ) will not be able to identify or trace the past interactions
between the tag and the current owner after having the ownership of the tag. Prior to
executing this protocol, we assume that the tag and the current owner both have each
other’s public key. We also assume that the owner has determined which tagged item that
s/he wishes to transfer the ownership of. The protocol is depicted in Figure 1 and detailed
as follows.

1. First, an Owneri chooses two random number r1 , r2 and sends A1 = r1 P, A2 =
r2 PKt to Tag.
2. Tag generates a nonce rt and answers with the following information: M1 = rt PKo ,
M2 = SKt−1 rt A2 + SKt A1 .
3. Upon receiving M1 and M2 , Owneri computes r1−1 (M2 − r2 SKi−1 M1 ) and checks
whether the value equals IDt . If not, Owneri rejects the Tag and terminates the
protocol execution; otherwise it randomly picks a temporary private key y0o , computes B1 = (r1 + r2 )P + SKi−1 y0o M1 and B2 = y0o PKt + SKi−1 M1 , and sends them to
Tag. y0o will be stored by Owneri and passed to the new owner as the ownership in
the future.
4. Tag computes A1 + SKt−1 A2 + rt SK −1 (B2 − rt P) and checks whether the result
equals to B1 . If so, it updates PKo with the value SKt−1 (B2 − rt P); otherwise Tag
terminates the protocol execution.

Tag
SKt = x, PKo = yi P

Owneri
SKo = yi , IDt = PKt = xP
r1 , r2 ∈R Z∗p
A1 = r1 P, A2 = r2 xP
A ,A

2
←−−1−−
−−

rt ∈R Z∗p
M1 = rt yi P
M2 = x−1 rt A2 + xA1
M ,M

1 2
−−−−
−−→

?

B ,B

IDt = r1−1 (M2 − r2 y−1
i M1 )
y0o ∈R Z∗p
0
B1 = (r1 + r2 )P + y−1
i yo M1
−1
0
B2 = yo xP + yi M1

2
←−−1−−
−−

PK 0 = x−1 (B2 − rt P)
?

B1 = A1 + x−1 A2 + rt PK 0
update PKo = PK 0

Figure 1. Key change protocol for current owner

Transfer Protocol. Since the interactions between owners are secure under the assumption, we assume the protocol is a general public-key based encryption protocol. The new
owner encrypts the ownership transfer request and the ID of the tag and sends the message to the current owner. Then after decrypting the message and authenticating the new
owner, the current owner encrypts the temporary private key y0o for interacting with the

Tag
SKt = x, PKo = y0o P

Owneri+1
y0o , SKi+1 = yi+1 ,
IDt = PKt = xP
r1 , r2 ∈R Z∗p
A1 = r1 P, A2 = r2 xP
A ,A

2
←−−1−−
−−

rt ∈R Z∗p
M1 = rt y0o P
M2 = x−1 rt A2 + xA1
M ,M

1 2
−−−−
−−→

?

IDt = r1−1 (M2 − r2 y0o −1 M1 )
B1 = (r1 + r2 )P + y0o −1 yi+1 M1
B2 = (yi+1 + r1 )xP + y0o −1 M1
B ,B

2
←−−1−−
−−

PK 0

= x−1 (B

2 − rt P) − A1
−1
B1 = A1 + x A2 + rt PK 0
update PKo = PK 0
?

Figure 2. Key update protocol for new owner

Tag

Owneri

Owneri+1

Key change protocol

←−−−−−−−−−−→
Transfer protocol

←−−−−−−−−→
Key update protocol

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

Figure 3. Protocol flows for ownership transfer

target tag, and sends the response back to the new owner. The new owner decrypts the
message and get y0o , thereby obtains the ownership of the tag.
Key Update Protocol. This protocol is executed when the new owner Owneri+1 obtains
the ownership of the target tag. Owneri+1 updates the owner’s public key stored in the tag
with its own public key. This procotol protects the tag and the new owner from malicious
previous owners so that they cannot identify or trace the interaction between the tag and
the new owner after giving out the ownership. The protocol is a small modification of

key change protocol for the current owner. The protocol phase is depicted in Figure 2
and detailed as follows.
1. Owneri+1 randomly chooses r1 , r2 and sends A1 = r1 P, A2 = r2 IDt to Tag.
2. Tag randomly picks a nonce rt and responses M1 = rt PKo , M2 = SKt−1 rt A2 +
SKt A1 .
3. Upon receiving M1 and M2 , Owneri+1 computes r1−1 (M2 − r2 y0−1
o M1 ) and checks
whether the value equals IDt . If not, Owneri+1 rejects Tag and terminates the
protocol execution; otherwise it computes B1 = (r1 + r2 )P + y0−1
o SKi+1 M1 and
B2 = (SKi+1 + r1 )PKt + y0o −1 M2 , and sends them to Tag. Owneri+1 will keep y0o
until it succeeds in communicating with Tag in future interactions.
4. Tag calculates A1 + SKt−1 A2 + rt (SKt−1 (B2 − rt P) − A1 ) and checks whether the
result equals to B1 . If so, it updates PKo with the value SKt−1 (B2 − rt P) − A1 ;
otherwise Tag terminates the protocol execution.
The combination of key change protocol, transfer protocol and key update protocol
is illustrated in Fig 3.
Controlled Delegation Protocol. Our delegation protocol uses counter stored in the tag,
like [4,13], to control the delegation phases. The current owner Owner sends the maximum number of queries that can be made to Tag. After each query sent by the delegate (denoted by Delegate), Tag increases the inside counter by 1. Once the counter
reaches the maximum value set by Owner, or Tag receives the cancellation command
from Owner, the delegation will be terminated. The details of the controlled delegation
protocol are described as follows.
1. First, Owner randomly chooses r1 , r2 and sends A1 = r1 P, A2 = r2 IDt to Tag.
2. Then, Tag generates a nonce rt and sends the following information: M1 = rt PKo ,
M2 = SKt−1 rt A2 + SKt A1 to Owner.
3. Upon receiving M1 and M2 , Owner verifies whether IDt equals the value of
r1−1 (M2 − r2 SKi−1 M1 ). If not, Owner rejects Tag and terminates the protocol execution; otherwise it generates a private key yd for temporary delegation, and computes B1 = (r1 + r2 )P + SKi−1 yd M1 and B2 = yd PKt + SKi−1 M1 . Owner also picks
cm , which is the maximum number of queries that can be made to Tag and calculates S = cm r2 P + r1 xP. Owneri sends B1 , B2 , cm and S to Tag. It also sends yd to
Delegate securely to authorise the delegation.
4. Tag computes A1 + SKt−1 A2 + rt SKt−1 (B2 − rt P) and checks whether the value
equals to B1 . It also compares S with cm x−1 A2 + xA1 . If both results are valid,
Tag then stores the cm and the current owner’s public key PKo , and computes the
temporary delegation key SKt−1 (B2 − rt P); otherwise Tag terminates the protocol
execution. The step 1 to 4 are presented in Fig 4.
5. Delegate interacts Tag with the delegation key SKd given by Owner. Each time
after being queried by Delegate, Tag adds the counter c by 1. Once c reaches the
maximum value cm , Tag replaces the delegation public key with Owner’s public
key so that no further queries can be made by Delegate. This procedure is described in Fig 5.

Tag
SKt = x, PKo = yP

Owner
SKo = y,
IDt = PKt = xP
r1 , r2 ∈R Z∗p
A1 = r1 P, A2 = r2 xP
A ,A

2
←−−1−−
−−

rt ∈R Z∗p
M1 = rt yP
M2 = x−1 rt A2 + xA1
M ,M

1 2
−−−−
−−→

?

IDt = r1−1 (M2 − r2 y−1 M1 )
yd ∈R Z∗p
B1 = (r1 + r2 )P + y−1 yd M1
B2 = yd xP + y−1 M1
pick cm
S = cm r2 P + r1 xP
B ,B ,cm ,S

1 2
←−
−−−−−

PK 0 = x−1 (B2 − rt P)
?

B1 = A1 + x−1 A2 + rt PK 0
?

S = cm x−1 A2 + xA1
update PKb = PKo
PKo = PK 0
c = 0 and store cm

Figure 4. Controlled delegation protocol - 1

6. Owner is also able to cancel the delegation protocol at any time. It chooses a
random r and sends the tuple (r, (ryd + y)P) as a cancellation request to Tag. After
verifying the validity of the request, Tag replaces the delegation public key with
the stored Owner’s public key and cancel the delegation. This procedure is showed
in Fig 6.

5. Security Analysis
5.1. Resistance to Attacks
Our scheme is secure against the attacks mentioned in 3.2.
1. Fresh nonces are used in our scheme to prevent replay attacks. An adversary is
unable to gain privileges by reusing an expired message.
2. Man-in-the-middle attacks are avoided because the tag and the owner in the
scheme authenticate each other using the public-private key pairs, which provides

Tag
SKt = x, PKo = yd P, PKb = yP
c, cm

Delegate
SKd = yd , IDt = PKt = xP

Query

←−−−−−−
Auth(PKo )
Response

−−−−−−→
c = c+1
?

c = cm
update PKo = PKb

Figure 5. Controlled delegation protocol - 2

Tag
SKt = x, PKo = yd P, PKb = yP

Owner
yd , SKo = y,
IDt = PKt = xP
r ∈R Z∗p
A = (ryd + y)xP
r,A

←−−−−−−
?

A = x(rPKo + PKb )
update PKo = PKb

Figure 6. Controlled delegation protocol - 3

the correctness of the messages so that an adversary cannot counterfeit any message that is valid.
3. Denial-of-service attacks occur when the tag and the reader are updating the keys.
An adversary can block the message sent by the owner from reaching the tag in
every protocol phases in order to desynchronise the tag and the owner. However,
our scheme resists against denial-of-service attacks in all the protocol phases. In
key change protocol phase and the controlled delegation protocol phase, if an adversary blocks the messages and causes the tag’s failure to update to the temporary
public keys, the current owner is still able to communicate with the tag and generate a new ownership transfer or controlled delegation key pair for the new owner
or delegate. In key update protocol phase, the new owner keeps the temporary private key until it succeeds to communicate with the tag using its own public-private
key pair in future queries. In addition, the tag always verifies the messages before
updating the owner’s public key. Hence, an adversary is unable to manipulate the
messages and cause the tag and the reader to lose synchronisation.

4. Backward traceability and forward traceability are resisted by our scheme. An
adversary will not be able to decipher the past or future messages between the
tag and any owner even though it knows the tag’s private key. This is because all
the messages involving the tag’s ID (i.e. the tag’s public key) are either encrypted
by the owner’s private key or protected by a randomly generated session nonce,
which is not publicly transmitted and only known by the sender. Since finding the
discrete logarithm of a elliptic curve point is infeasible, the adversary is unlikely
to identify the tag from the past or future transactions.
5.2. Privacy Preservation for Owners
Previous owner privacy and new owner privacy are guaranteed by key change protocol
and key update protocol.
The previous owner randomly chooses a temporary public-private key pair and
changes its public key stored in the tag before transferring the ownership to the new
owner. After the ownership is transferred, the new owner is not able to reveal the past
transactions between the tag and the old owner because there is no link between the temporary key and the key of the previous owner. Hence previous owner privacy is effectively assured.
Later in the key update protocol, after authenticating the tag, the new owner sends
a change request to update the temporary public key in the tag. Since the new owner’s
public key is protected by the tag’s private key and a fresh nonce, it is unlikely the
previous owner can extract or change the new owner’s private key. Hence the future
communications between the tag and the new owner is protected from the previous owner
and new owner privacy is also assured.
5.3. Controlled Delegation and Authorisation Recovery
In our scheme, the present owner gives the delegation key to a third party for delegation procedure. Since the key is temporarily generated, there is no linkage between the
delegation key and the owner’s key. Also note that the tag stores the owner’s public
key. Therefore, when the queries made by the delegate reaches the allowed times, or the
owner sends the command for cancelling delegation, the owner can always regain the
full control over the tag. The delegate must request the owner for further access to the
tag after the allowed queries are made.
Authorisation recovery is a special case of controlled delegation. The current owner
stores the temporary key pair when it obtains the ownership from the previous owner.
In the step 3 of controlled delgation protocol, the current owner simply transfers the
temporary public key to the tag instead of a randomly chosen delegation key. It also
does not need to send the private key to the previous owner since the previous owner is
the one who generates the temporary key. As a result, the previous owner and the tag
can communicate with each other using the temporary key pair. Just like the controlled
delegation process, the authorisation recovery will expire when the counter in the tag
reaches the maximum number set by the current owner, or when the tag receives the
cancellation request from the current owner.

6. Performance Aspects
The proposed tag ownership transfer scheme depends on elliptic curve cryptography.
The protocol phases use the operations, including modular additions and multiplications,
and point multiplication on an elliptic curve. Among these three, point multiplication is
the most complicated operation for passive tags. Our scheme can be easily implemented
in the lightweight RFID processor architecture presented by Lee et al. in 2010 [9]. The
RFID processor consists of a micro controller, a bus manager and a elliptic curve processor. With the operating frequency of 700 KHz, the power consumption of the processor
is 13.8 µW and the cycles is 59, 790 per elliptic curve point multiplication. The performance results for our scheme are illustrated in Table 2. Therefore, our scheme is feasible
for passive tags and any phases of our proposed scheme can be completed in less than
800 ms.
Table 2. Performance results of our protocols
Protocol phases

Point
multiplications

Cycles

Time (ms)

Key change protocol
Key update protocol

7
7

418, 530
418, 530

598
598

Controlled delegation protocol - delegate
Controlled delegation protocol - cancellation

9
2

538, 110
119, 580

769
171

7. Conclusion
We have proposed a new RFID ownership transfer protocol in this paper. We describe the
different phases of the protocol, such as key change protocol, transfer potocol, key update protocol and controlled delegation protocol. We have carried out analysis of the proposed protocol and have shown that it meets the required security and privacy features.
The ownership transfer process is performed without a trusted third party. It also allows
controlled delegation and authorisation recovery. Our scheme is feasible for lightweight
RFID tags in terms of power consumption and processing time. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first elliptic-curve based secure ownership transfer protocol.
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